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The idea that there is wisdom from the collective has been forcefully described in “The Wisdom
of the Crowds” by James Surowiecki, who argues that the aggregation of information in groups
results in better decisions than those that are afforded by any single member of the group.
Markets, like opinion polls, are one mechanism for aggregating disparate pieces of information.
The aggregation properties of prices were first noted by Hayek (1945) and were formally
examined by Muth (1961). In particular, Hayek argues that market prices serve the purpose of
sharing and coordinating local and personal knowledge, while Muth shows that markets do not
waste information and that the current price contains all the information available from market
participants. 1
Essentially, markets are information processors, taking the “wisdom” from the “crowd” of
traders and distilling it into a price. In a famous paper, Roll (1984) examines the market for
concentrated orange juice. He found that 98% of concentrated orange juice production takes
1

Fama's 1970 article provides strong empirical support for this efficient market hypothesis, i.e., security
markets are extremely efficient in reflecting the complete and accurate information about the fundamental
asset value.
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place in central Florida and its value is directly related to cold weather in the region. Roll
examined futures contract prices for concentrated orange juice and found that if the closing
futures price is higher than its opening price, a more accurate prediction of a freeze can be
made by adjusting downward the National Weather Service’s temperature forecast.
Prediction markets are special case of asset markets (see Noussair and Tucker this issue for a
discussion) where the value of the traded asset is contingent upon the outcome of some
uncertain event at or before some prespecified point in time and not upon a claim to some
underlying asset as in a futures market for orange juice. In more concrete terms, suppose there
is an asset that will pay $0 if event A occurs, $2 if event B occurs and $3 if event C occurs. If
some traders have certain information that event A will not occur and other traders have
certain information that event B will not occur, then if they pooled (aggregated) their
information they would know that event C is a certainty and the asset should be worth $3. The
question is whether a market in which such an asset was trading would arrive at the $3 price,
thus effectively aggregating the information and letting everyone know that event C will occur.
One of the most well-known and well-studied prediction markets is the Iowa Electronic Market
for US Presidential Elections. In this market a trader can pay $1 to purchase a pair of shares.
Essentially, one share pays $1 if the Democratic candidate wins the popular vote in the US next
presidential election and $0 otherwise. The other share has a similar payoff structure for the
Republican candidate.2 At the time this is being written the market price for the democrat
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Technically, the shares payoff if that party’s candidate receives the majority of the votes cast for one of those two
parties. That is votes for other parties are not considered. The Iowa Electronic Market also operates markets for
the vote share in US presidential elections as well as markets for Congressional election outcomes and stated
Federal Reserve Policies.
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share is 0.60 indicating a 60% chance that the democratic candidate, Barak Obama, will receive
the majority of the popular vote in the 2012 election. Over the last several presidential election
cycles, the Iowa Electronic Market has been found to outperform more traditional means of
aggregating opinions of candidates such as opinion polls (Berg, et al. 2003). In particular, they
examine national polls for the 1988 through 2004 U.S. Presidential elections versus
synchronous vote share market prices. The result of the exercise finds that over 964 polls
during this time period, the market is closer to the eventual outcome 74% of the time in the
vote share markets (see Figure 1, which is taken from Arrow, et al. 2008). Similar exercises
have been carried out by Wolfers and Leigh (2002) for local elections in Australia and Pennock
et al. (2001) for box office receipts in the Hollywood Exchange 3 and both document the relative
accuracy of prediction markets.
Figure 1: IEM Prediction Market Accuracies (from Arrow2008)
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The Hollywood Exchange uses artificial currency in its market.
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Prediction markets are now used in a wide variety of settings. In particular, many firms have
begun experimenting with internal prediction markets to gauge forecasts of events important
to the firm. For example, Chen and Plott (2002) developed prediction markets for HewlettPackard Corporation (HP) to forecast sales of products (monthly dollar sales or units sold, three
months in the future). There were between 20 to 30 market participants who were firm
employees in marketing and finance. They found that the market prices outperformed official
HP forecasts. Google has been using prediction market on a large scale since 2005 with its
employees. Participants in the Google markets are given an amount of artificial currency
(“Goobles”) to buy and sell “securities” in specific events that pays off in Goobles.

The

markets were designed to forecast product launch dates, new office openings, and many other
items of strategic importance to Google. Cowgill (2009) found that the while Google markets
were reasonably good at predicting events, there was a tendency towards optimism. In
addition, this optimism was even more pronounced on days in which Google stock did well.
Other companies are now starting to experiment with prediction markets for their own
forecasting elements.
The largest public prediction market in the world is Intrade.com and it offers contracts on
scientific discoveries, the economy, current events, and geo-political relationships. Prediction
markets have even been used to forecast outbreaks of contagious diseases (Polgreen, et al.
2007) and the number of cattle being brought to slaughter (Gallardo 2009). Despite their
widespread usage, existing prediction markets cover only a fraction of the domain in which
such markets could be used to extract information. Hahn and Tetlock (2005) argue for
prediction markets to be used for setting monetary policy. After the terrorist attacks of
4

September 2001, a proposal was developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
to create a Policy Analysis Market (PAM) for the purpose of using prediction markets to identify
likely threats to US security and deploy resources accordingly. In 2008, a group of prominent
economist wrote in Science about the promise of prediction markets and called for reducing the
legal constraints on these markets in the U.S. to harness their power for a variety of uses (See
Arrow, et al. 2008).
One of the main obstacles to the implementation of prediction markets, other than concerns
about running afoul of gambling laws, is concern about the degree to which they can be
manipulated. Setting Federal Reserve Bank policy or National Security policy with systems that
can be manipulated is clearly problematic. However, previous attempts to manipulate existing
markets have been largely unsuccessful at creating nontransitory price movement: “The profit
motive has usually proven sufficient to ensure that attempts at manipulating these [prediction]
markets were unsuccessful.” (Wolfers and Zitsewitz, 2004, p. 119). Wolfers and Leigh (2002)
discuss failed attempts by political candidates to manipulate markets predicting their own
success. 4 Also looking at political prediction markets, Rhode and Strumph (2009, p. 37)
conclude that “In almost every speculative attack, prices experienced measurable initial
changes. However, these movements were quickly reversed and prices returned close to their
previous levels.”
In order for the prices in a prediction market to aggregate information there has to be a
relationship between prices and traders beliefs. From a theoretical perspective there can be a
divergence between mean beliefs and the equilibrium price (see Manski 2006). This divergence
4

Hansen, et al. (2004) were able to manipulate election predictions, but only temporarily.
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is tempered when traders are risk averse (see Gjerstad 2005). In this paper we see the ability of
prediction markets to aggregate information or be manipulated as an empirical question and as
such our focus is on the results from laboratory experiments.5
The Success of Markets Aggregating Information
Plott and Sunder (1988) introduced what has become the classic information aggregation
experiment. Like many previous experiments up to that point, their market used a double
auction mechanism due to the demonstrated success this institution had in other environments
and the dynamic opportunity for traders to adjust their behavior as bids and asks entered the
market (as opposed to the static nature of institutions such as a sealed bid offer market where
a trader could not update his choices based upon feedback from the market within the period).
The traders were all endowed with a large amount of cash and a fixed number of shares. So
that profits were tied only to trading and asset dividends, the cash was treated as a loan which
had to be repaid at the end of trading. Shares paid dividends to whoever held them when
trading was done, but the dividend amount depended upon which of three possible states of
the world (denoted X, Y, and Z) was realized and the type of the trader who held the asset (with
type being defined by state dependent dividend payoff structure). Prior to trading, Plott and
Sunder (1988) drew a ball from a bingo cage to determine the state of the world where the
likelihood of each state being drawn was common information among the traders. 6 However,
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For a more general review of prediction markets, see Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007).
Smith (1994) makes a distinction between common information, when data are available to everyone, from
common knowledge, which involves knowing that everyone knows the information, knowing that everyone knows
the information, and knowing that everyone knows that everyone knows the information, and so on. It is one
thing for everyone to know that a stock market bubble is about to burst; it is another to know that everyone else
knows it is about to burst.
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traders were not informed of the realization; instead each trader was told one of the two states
that was not drawn. If, for example, the state was X, then half of the traders were told the
state was not Y and the other half were told that the state was not Z. Thus, in aggregate the
market participants knew the outcome, but no individual trader knew it. Each experimental
session involved multiple sequential markets with endowments, shares, and state drawings
being reinitialized before each market in the session.
In total, Plott and Sunder (1988) report the results of 11 sessions totaling 175 markets, each
somewhat different from the others including the school from which the subjects were
recruited, the number of trader types, the dividend values for each type, the number of traders,
endowments, and shares as well as the experience level of the subjects, the duration of the
experiment, and whether or not short sales were allowed. 7 This heterogeneity in the
experimental design makes it somewhat difficult to identify the specific effects of any particular
aspect of the market, but the researchers classify the markets into three series. In series A,
there was only a single class of asset and there were always multiple types of traders. A
rational for having multiple types is that trading should occur in equilibrium as shares are
moved from those who value them least to those who value them most. If everyone had the
same value for the shares, then there may be little incentive for any trading to occur. For these
series A markets, Plott and Sunder (1988) find that information is not well aggregated and
efficiency is lower than the rational expectation model would predict. However, they do find

7

In this experiment, when short sales were allowed, traders had to subsequently buy shares in order to cover the
short sales or had to pay an extremely large penalty.
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that the allocations and profits are generally consistent with the rational expectations model in
the last occurrence of a particular dividend state.
Plott and Sunder (1988) find stronger support for the rational expectations model in their two
other sets of markets. In series B the assets are state contingent. Thus rather than trading a
single asset that pays off one of three possible dividend amounts, subjects are trading three
assets, each of which payoff in a single state. For example, the X asset pays a positive dividend
in state X, but does not have a payoff in states Y or Z. In series C there is only a single type of
trader. That both of these sets of markets produce results that are generally consistent with
rational expectations and have prices that reflect aggregated information are important for
prediction markets, because most such markets operate with both state dependent assets and
a uniform dividend structure.
“Success” in these and other laboratory markets is defined by the rational expectations model,
where all of the information is aggregated into the market price, outperforming more myopic
models. This should not be construed to mean that all trades occur at the price level that
reflects all of the disparate information held by the traders. Indeed, when trading begins there
is only private information and it takes time and trading activity for bids, asks, and contracts to
reflect more than a trader’s private information. For this reason, one would expect prices to
move towards the full information level during the course of trading. Thus, researchers
typically focus on closing prices rather than starting or average prices. The starting location and
speed of convergence likely depend on a wide variety of factors from the distribution of
information to the risk attitudes of the traders. Further, market prices are likely to experience

8

variability and often do not obtain the theoretically predicted price even at the end of the
trading horizon, a fact that may be lost in some of the rhetoric of prediction markets. Figure 2
shows the observed behavior in one of the series C sessions, where one can clearly see these
behavioral patterns. This figure plots contract prices over the course of the experiment blocked
by market period with the true state shown in parenthesis and the average price given above
the chart. The thick / dashed / dotted lines denote the Rational Expectations / Prior
Information / Maximin model price predictions. 8
Figure 2. Market 7 from Plott and Sunder (1988)

Noting that Plott and Sunder’s (1988) success had come when the market involved a complete
set of contingent claims or when preferences were identical, Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) set
out to identify conditions under which a single security would obtain the price predicted by the
rational expectations model when traders had diverse preferences. As such Forsythe and
Lundholm (1990) closely follow Plot and Sunder (1988) in most respects (endowments of cash
and shares, no short sales, double auction, etc.). They conducted two sets of experiments:

8

The prior Information model assumes that traders update their beliefs after observing the private signal
according to Bayes rule and act upon this probability to maximize their expected payoff. The maximin model
assumes that traders will not purchase an asset unless the price is below the minimum possible value the trader
knows the asset could take with certainty.
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what they call “better chance” and what one might call more challenging. As the name
indicates the better chance markets “were designed to give the (Rational Expectations) model a
better chance for success…” (p. 311). In these markets, the two dividend structures were
common information, unlike in the prior study. Also unlike the prior study, subjects gained
experience by participating with the same group on two different days with everyone switching
dividend structures on the second day. 9
By and large, by the end of the first day (12 to 15 market periods) trading did not successfully
aggregate information as observed prices varied little with the true state. By the second day
behavior did conform to the rational expectations model, at least for closing prices in the last
few market periods. However, earlier on the second day closing prices are often better
described by a private information model. For example in “Market 4” with experienced traders,
shown in Figure 2, the prior information model outperforms the rational expectations model in
periods 1, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18. Had this session only lasted 17 periods like the
other three once experienced better chance markets, the authors would not have been able to
tout the success of the rational expectations model “by the last occurrence of each state” in all
these sessions. Again, when information aggregation occurs in the market, it does so through
trading so the initial prices are based upon private information and other idiosyncratic aspects
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Of course there were several other differences as well including intentional ones such as the use of a mechanized
device to select the true state each period and unintentional ones such as the subject pools (in this case MBA and
undergraduate students at a different school). This second point is not meant as a criticism, but as a reminder that
pure replication is never possible. Things like the room temperature, the gender of the researcher, or the time of
day are not normally reported in experiments, but any of these features could add variation in observed behavior.
Thus, it is important for a wider variety of researchers to conduct similar variations of important results and that
one should be cautious with regards to any single study, but can feel comfortable with results that are shown to be
robust. Thus, the similarity in the results between Plott and Sunder (1988) and the inexperienced subjects in
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) better chance markets despite the slight variations gives greater confidence in the
reliability of the behavior.
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of the traders. During a market period prices tend to move from a common starting point
towards the rational expectations price conditional on the true state. Casual inspection of the
relevant figures in Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) reveal that the speed of convergence within a
period varies wildly, but often the average price and the closing price are not close, see Figure
3. In this figure the legend is the same as in Figure 2, but trading volume and total efficiency by
period have been added to the top of the chart.
Figure 3. Market 4 from Forsythe and Lundholm (1990)

From the better chance markets the authors conclude that experience, common knowledge of
the dividend structure and of trader types, and relatively thick markets are sufficient for the
rational expectations predictions to be accurate. Experience took two forms in the better
chance markets: one was familiarity with the trading institution and market operations and the
other was having participated as a trader with the alternative dividend structure. To explore
this last feature the authors conducted some “constant type” experiments where the traders
11

retained the same dividend structure both days, but still had common information regarding
both dividend structures. The results were similar to the better chance markets and the
authors conclude that switching types is not necessary for convergence.
Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) also conducted a series of experiments where they removed the
common information about dividends so that a trader only knows his or her own private payoff
for each state. In these “no common knowledge” treatment market prices do not reflect
information aggregation indicating that common dividend information is necessary. Fortunately
for advocates of prediction markets the traded assets pay the same dividend to everyone and
thus the dividend structure is common information. Additionally, Forsythe and Lundholm
(1990) conducted “experience and random type” sessions where subjects were twice
experienced having participated in one of the pairs of better chance sessions and where the
dividend type was randomly assigned in each market. In these cases, closing prices again
converged to the rational expectations predictions by the end session, but average prices
throughout the day and closing prices in early markets did not. From this, the authors conclude
that repeated experience with the same people and a fixed dividend structure are not
necessary for the success of the rational expectations model. The former is important for
prediction markets given the way they are normally operationalized in practice.
More recently, Bodsky (2012) considers the case where two states of the world are possible,
but traders only observe a noisy signal of the true state. In these experiments, subjects were
shown two distributions of marbles, which were deposited into identical bags. One of the bags
was then randomly selected and subjects had to predict which one had been chosen. Subjects

12

were endowed with cash and shares of two types of contingent assets, one for each possible
bag that could have been selected. Each subject privately observed a single draw from the
selected bag and could trade with the other participants based upon this private information.
This process was repeated so that each subject ultimately observed several draws from the
selected bag. 10 Subjects were also asked to state their subjective probabilistic belief about
which bag had been drawn. Bodsky (2012) found considerable variation in behavior, with most,
but not all sessions pricing the assets near the Bayesian predictions.
Comparisons of Predication Markets with Other Mechanisms for Information Aggregation
The demonstrated success and popularity of (double auction) markets for aggregating
information has led to it being a standard of comparison for other institutions such as surveys
or scoring rules. 11 Graefe (2010) argues that prediction markets outperform surveys when
judgment is needed. However, Rieg and Schoder (2012) find little justification for the use of
prediction markets, which may be more costly to operate, in comparison to surveys. They use
two lab experiments and an online study. Each experiment compares a double auction, a
scoring rule, and a survey. In the two lab experiments, subjects predict the outcomes of soccer
games while the researchers vary the diversity of information and do not allow entry/exit nor
do they allow users to do research. In the online experiment, entry/exit, information diversity,
and information search are not controlled. They find that all of the procedures yield similar
accuracy in the lab experiments, a finding similar to earlier work reported in Rieg and Schoder
10

This process is similar to Camerer (1987) except that information was private. The point of the Camerer
experiments was to see if the market would correctly price the assets and in general the market price was similar
to the price that would be obtained under Bayesian updating.
11
Chen and Pennock (2010) provide a detailed survey of the various types of institutions for aggregating
information.
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(2010). However, in the online experiments, they concluded that the market is less accurate,
which they attribute in part to difficulty in maintaining ongoing participation in markets. Graefe
and Armstrong (2010) also compare prediction markets and surveys as well as other methods
such as face-to-face meetings. In addition to finding little evidence that prediction markets
outperform other methods of making a forecast, they report that participants were least
satisfied with the process when engaging in prediction markets.
Healy, et al. (2012) compare pari-mutuel betting with double auction markets. 12 They find that
in simple environments where there is a single event with a binary state, the double auction
performs relatively well even though their markets are very thin involving only three traders.
This result is also encouraging for many prediction markets which tend to focus on single events
and may operate with relatively small numbers of traders. In their study, subjects observe
“several flips” of one of two possible “biased coins” and try to predict the chance that a future
flip will be heads. Healy, et al. (2012) also find that in more complicated environments where
there are multiple correlated information states the double auction does not perform as well.
Instead, they find that the Delphi or iterated poll method is superior not only outperforming
the double auction and pari-mutuel betting, but also outperforming the market scoring rule of
Hanson (2003). 13 Of course, these results are all conditional on the very thin three person
markets used in the study.

12

Plott, et al (2003) also study pari-mutual betting markets. They find mixed success for these systems in
aggregating information as predicted by the rational expectations model.
13
Blohm, et al. (2012) use experimental markets with scoring rules in a two (single market v multiple market) by
three (levels of elasticity) experimental design. They find that multiple markets improve efficiency, but that the
impact of a change in elasticity depends on the number of markets and the level of elasticity.
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Ledyard, et al. (2009) also looks at cases where there are multiple correlated events. The
events were stochastic, e.g. in the simple environment event X occurred with a 70% chance, Y
had a 20% chance of matching X, and Z had a 50% chance of occurring independently of X and
Y. Different subjects observed realizations of different pairs of these stochastic processes but
did not know if they were observing X, Y or Z. In their most complicated environment there
were 8 events (i.e. 28 = 256 possible states). For their double auction markets, traders could
trade simple shares for each event, thus in the complicated environment there were 8
markets. 14 This institution was compared to a combinatorial call market where traders could
place bids or asks for single events or combinations of event outcomes. They report that the
double auction did not perform well. This result may be due in part to the implementation, but
this remains an open question as the authors did not operate a non-combinatorial call market
or a combinatorial double auction. The authors also considered scoring rules and opinion polls
and found that market scoring performed relatively well in the complicated environment. 15
Together these papers suggest that prediction markets are not universally the best choice.
Rather, it is important to identify when prediction markets are a good choice.

The answer

depends at least in part on the extent of the robustness of these markets to insiders or
manipulators.
How Do Insiders Impact Markets?
14

There was a single market for each event (event A occurs), rather than two markets (A occurs and A does not
occur) as short sales were allowed.
15
Klingert and Meyer (2012) use simulations to compare continuous double auctions and market scoring. They
conclude that market scoring is preferable. Jian and Sami (2012) investigate two forms of a market scoring rule,
one in which people directly state their probabilistic beliefs and one in which traders reveal their beliefs by trading
assets with an automated market maker. Ultimately they find that both mechanisms perform equally well.
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In another seminal paper, Plott and Sunder (1982) report a series of experiments on a market’s
ability to disseminate information more so than aggregate it. These markets were similar to
those in Plott and Sunder (1988) described above in many respects (endowments of cash and
shares, trading via double auction, state and type dependent payoffs, process for determining
state). However, what was different was the distribution of information. In four of their five
sessions, when a trader received information it perfectly identified the true state that would
determine dividends. In the fifth (identified as Market 1 in the paper) informed traders
observed a series of signals (draws from the bingo cage) so that they had a noisy signal of the
true state. However, each informed trader observed the same set of signals and thus would
have the same posterior beliefs from Bayesian updating.
In some market periods of Plott and Sunder (1982) no one received information about the true
state, in others only some traders received information and in the remaining markets everyone
knew the true state. If a trader has better information then other traders, the informed trader
can attempt to exploit this informational advantage, but doing so will reveal (and thus
eliminate) the informational advantage. For example, if an individual knows that the price of an
asset is too low, then that person should purchase shares in order to take advantage of the
situation. In doing so, the trader will bid up the price of the asset until the price reflects this
private information. There were several idiosyncrasies across sessions, including an extra
possible state in one, fewer traders in another, various numbers of markets in a session,
differing patterns of information conditions, and differences in the commonality of information
regarding the number of insiders. This heterogeneity again makes it difficult to identify the
effects of specific aspects of the experimental design, but in aggregate the results provide
16

general support for the rational expectations model in terms of prices, allocations, efficiency,
and profits. Thus, the information that insiders possess is disseminated through the market
trading process. 16
Banks (1985) noted that Plott and Sunder (1982) did not vary the identity of the informed
traders leading open the possibility that uniformed traders had simply learned who to follow
rather than the market having aggregated information. To separate this explanation from the
one preferred by Plott and Sunder (1982), Banks replicated their design except that the identity
of the informed traders was randomized each period. The results support the claims of Plott
and Sunder with respect to the pricing dynamics, but also indicate that the strength of the
results in later periods may have been biased by this feature of the design.
Camerer and Weigelt (1991) also explored a market environment where insiders with perfect
information may or may not be present. In most other respects their markets were similar to
those previously discussed (traders were endowed with shares and cash, short sales were
prohibited, trading via double auction, etc.). Traders knew their own values in each state but
not the values of the other traders. In market periods in which there were insiders the identity
of those insiders was determined randomly. All of these procedures were common information
among the traders. They reported that in markets where insiders were present, the rational
expectations model again describes closing prices reasonably well. When there were no
insiders, there is no information for the market to aggregate. However, as uninformed traders
do not know of the absence of insiders it is possible for them to misinterpret the behavior of
16

Friedman, et al. (1984) introduced a futures market for an asset that endures for three trading periods. They
report that futures markets stabilize spot prices and help facilitate the leakage of insider information.
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other uniformed traders as revealing insider information. If an uninformed trader acts on such
a mistake, this can serve as a signal to other uninformed traders thereby creating an
information “mirage.” However, sustained mirages were only observed in 4 of the 47 periods
where such mirages are possible suggesting that information markets are not very susceptible
to this phenomenon, which is good news for the functioning prediction markets.
Manipulation
In any market, a trader may want to manipulate the price so that he or she can subsequently
take advantage of the price. For example, a trader would like to push the price of an asset
down so that she could cheaply purchase a large volume, which could be sold at a profit once
the price has recovered. Veiga and Vorsatz (2010) find evidence that asset market prices can be
manipulated in the short run under certain conditions. In their markets there are both
informed and uninformed traders, but each trader’s type is private information. Thus, when a
robot trader is introduced with the strategy of buying early and selling late regardless of
profitability, uninformed traders cannot tell the buying behavior is not being driven by the
informed traders. When the asset should have a high price this strategy pushes prices towards
the correct level, but when the asset should have a low price this strategy does have a
transitory effect. The automated strategy proved profitable, but still Veiga and Vorsatz (2010)
report that “The presence of the robot trader does not affect the last contract price
significantly.” (p. 385.).
Prediction markets also face the danger that a manipulator may successfully alter the price so
that policy makers who are using the aggregated information will be misled. Returning to the
18

example of the PAM proposed by DARPA, if a terrorist could mislead the Department of
Defense about how to allocate resources then such markets are of little value for national
security. The same is true for other prediction markets that are taken as inputs to other
decision making problems, but the imagery is not as stark.
In a direct test with incentives for manipulation, Hanson et al. (2006) create a laboratory
information market in which an asset has three initially equally likely dividends (0, 40 and 100).
As in Plott and Sunder (1988), some participants have information that one of the dividends is
not available (e.g. “not 40”) and other participants have information that another dividend is
not available (e.g. “not 0”). Together participants would have full information about the actual
outcome. For obvious reasons, they call this their replication treatment (RT). They contrast this
condition with a treatment in which there are known manipulators who get rewarded not only
on their portfolio outcome but also with a bonus based on the median contract price for the
period. The higher the median contract price, the higher the manipulator’s bonus in this
manipulation treatment (MT). Figure 4 shows the price results of these experiments.
Hanson et al. (2006) find that manipulators submit higher bids than non-manipulators (in line
with their incentives), but they have no effect on the information aggregation properties of the
market because non-manipulators tend to accept contracts at lower prices.
countervailing strategies that stymie manipulation attempts.

19

It is these

Figure 4. Comparison of Replication Treatment (RT)
and Manipulation Treatment (MT) in Hanson et al (2006)

In a follow-up study Oprea et al. (2007) are the first to ask a fundamental question: Can
individuals without any specific information about the underlying value of an asset, forecast the
actual state by just viewing the contract formation in an information as an outsider? That is,
can a policymaker use the information from bids, ask and contracts in an information market to
better forecast the actual state, and presumably better allocate his resources, than if he relied
only on his (lack of) prior information? To do this, they create an environment in which there
are but two states (0 or 100). Each trader receives a signal (+ or -). If the true state is 0,
participants draw signals (with replacement) from a bag containing 1 + and 2 - marbles; If the
true state is 100, participants draw signals (with replacement) from a bag containing 2 + and 1 -

20

marbles.

Armed with this information, participants trade in the market.

The Basyesian

posterior based on the number of gray signals in the market is provided in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Expected Price conditional on Aggregate Number of + Signals (Oprea et al. 2007)

The uninformed outside forecasters in this market are rewarded if they accurately forecast the
state after the market closes. The black line in the above figure shows the predicted forecast
from a fully informed Bayesian. To this setting, they introduce manipulators who are given a
target randomly selected from {0,100}. The manipulators are rewarded based on both their
profits in the market and how far off the average forecast (of the three forecasters) was relative
to the manipulator’s target. Figure 6 shows how well the forecaster performed on each
treatment. They find that manipulators try to manipulate prices, but the forecasts are not
impaired. This result is highly encouraging in that forecasters were able to use the market to
improve their predictions and that manipulation attempts did not significantly impact this
process in a negative way.
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Figure 6. Forecaster Accuracy (Oprea et al. 2007)

In an attempt to stress test the robustness of this manipulation process, Deck et al. (2012) note
that the Oprea et al. design does not measure the intensity of the forecaster’s beliefs. Thus,
their design has forecasters investing in which state they believe will occur. As payoffs are
quadratic, forecasters have a direct incentive to reveal their beliefs. Further, Deck et al. argue
that the incentives of the manipulators have been heretofore relatively weak because 1.
rewards from successful manipulation may be offset by losses from trading activities and 2.
with multiple manipulators there is pressure to free rider. To address these two points, at most
a single manipulator is active in any period in Deck, et al and the manipulator is only
compensated based on how well she fools uninformed forecasters (i.e. manipulators were not
paid on their portfolio). Finally, the manipulator is well-heeled so she is not cash constrained.
In other respects Deck et al. follows Oprea et al except that traders could create shares by
setting aside enough cash to cover the maximum possible dividend payment. In the treatments
without manipulators, they affirm the result that forecasters can exploit information in the
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market to make predictions that are better than random guessing. This suggests that fixed
supply of shares that has characterized most prediction market studies is not necessary.
However, when manipulators are present, the forecasters do not better than random guessing,
clearly demonstrating the destructive nature that a manipulator can do with sufficient incentive
and wherewithal. Deck et al. do identify a silver lining: manipulators increase trade volume
and information can be gleaned from the excess bids or asks in the market. Still, more research
is needed to investigate how forecaster, traders, and manipulators might alter their behavior if
it is common knowledge that previous work has identified that manipulators increase volume
but information remains in the excess bids.
Future Work
To date, lab experiments have shown that markets do a reasonably good job of aggregating
and/or disseminating information.

This parallels what has been observed in the field.

However, the success of prediction markets should not be construed to mean that in the lab
markets provide fully aggregated information during the trading process or always outperform
other means of aggregating beliefs. It is not as though prediction markets are a panacea while
opinion polls and other methods are no better than random guesses. Rather, prediction
markets provide a viable means for harnessing the “wisdom of crowds,” at least under certain
conditions such as when the number of traders is reasonably thick, the states are not too
complex, the payoff structure is relatively simple, and the incentives and wherewithal to
manipulate are relatively small.
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Clearly more research is needed to fully understand the conditions under which prediction
markets are robust to manipulation attempts if such markets are going to be used as decision
making inputs or for the allocation of resources. One obvious gap in the experimental literature
is the case where there is heterogeneity among manipulators in terms of the optimal direction
they wish to push prices. Another, more critical, gap in the literature concerns the situation in
which the state is endogenous or under the control of those who can trade. Again, taking the
example of the PAM markets, if the market prices were observable then a terrorist could
condition an attack on a low price that indicates a low probability of attack. Of course, this
would make an attack more likely when the price was low, which would drive prices up making
an attack less likely which would push prices back down making an attack more likely an so on.
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